澳洲研究学论文代写:中国的证券和财务管理

澳洲研究学论文代写:中国的证券和财务管理

最近,由于新的计划和发展,中国零售市场的投资基金迅速增长。在资本市场的基金管理方面,也出现了羊群行为和黑屏现象。传统上,基金管理费是由国家规定的。根据这些指令,市场对业绩的变化做出了反应,进一步为中国企业营造了环境。

《中华人民共和国证券投资基金法》对托管人投资的证券和基金进行管理。基金通过托管人集中投资资金和托管,由基金经理管理,通过金融工具用于股票、债券和其他投资。最初,证券投资基金制度还制定了一种权力制衡制度,即托管与托管人、基金管理人共同管理。因此,对基金实行双重监管。一旦资产被投资,基金托管人和投资者不会直接干预。监督只能通过参加由基金举办的大会来进行。很多投资者认为,统一起来有很多困难,“搭便车”现象非常严重。

澳洲研究学论文代写:中国的证券和财务管理

共同基金公司为管理投资组合收取的费用按基金资产的百分比确定。基金公司甚至更有可能将管理费与基金业绩与其基准挂钩。绩效费或奖励费是否能提高回报,还是仅仅是能够说服投资者购买优质管理层的营销标准,这是一个主要问题。从理论上讲,这些激励费用是好的,因为积极的基金经理有额外的理由提高基金业绩。此外,基金经理的收入百分比越高,基金经理的收入百分比越低。

澳洲研究学论文代写:中国的证券和财务管理

Recently, investment funds in China’s retail market have grown rapidly owing to new schemes and developments. There are also signs of herd behaviour and black screen being observed in regard to the fund management in the capital markets. Traditionally, the fund manager fee had been regulated from the state. And as per these directives, the market was responding to changes in performance and further built the climate for Chinese businesses.

Securities Investment Fund Law of the People’s Republic of China governs the securities and funds invested through custodians. Funds focus investment money and trusteeship through custodians, managed by fund managers for use in stocks, bonds and other investments through financial instruments. Initially, the Securities Investment Fund System also prepared a Balance of Power system where the trusteeship is with custodian and management by fund managers. Therefore, there is dual supervision for fund. There is no direct intervention from fund custodian and investors once the assets are invested. The supervision is only exercised by attending to congress held by fund. A large number of investors have the opinion that there are many difficulties to unify, and ‘free rider’ phenomenon is very serious.

澳洲研究学论文代写:中国的证券和财务管理

The fees that mutual-fund firms collect for managing portfolios are set as a percentage of fund assets. It is even more likely that a fund firm can link management fees to a fund’s performance versus its benchmark. Can performance or incentive fees enhance returns, or are they just marketing criteria that can persuade investors into purchasing superior management is a main question. Theoretically, these incentive fees are good as active managers have additional reason for boosting fund performance. Also, asset managers are paid high percentage the better funds do and low percentage the worse they do.