This situation can work as a blessing in disguise for the elites, because in case of coalition between the middle class and the poor, the elites can dissuade the middle class from the poor by extending their voting rights and in some cases providing them bribes. However, if the middle class is apparently poorer as well, then even partial democracies will generate policies. This type of behaviour can be easily seen in some of the Asian and African countries where the middle class is in abundance and there arises a crisis in political economy (Haggard, S., 2000).
Another important situation where the middle class plays the key role is the situation of repression in a democracy. In a society with high levels of inequality, democratic system would embrace strategies that are drastically distinctive to those favoured by the rich. Anticipating this, the rich will utilize repression to avert democratization. In a model of redistributive tax assessment, poor people, who constitute a greater part in people’s government, are in favour of high rates of income distribution. However, if the middle class is in abundance, the maximum voters could be from this middle section; moreover, if the middle class is relatively affluent, then this maximum would go for constrained distribution of economies. Therefore, moderately extensive and affluent middle class acts as a cradle between the elites and the poor thereby breaking the distribution of economies and policies. By guaranteeing that policies are not too far from those preferred by the rich, it demoralizes the elites from utilizing repression and makes democracy more probable and more stable as well.
By a practically unavoidable augmentation, the economic growth of a nation has been generally regarded as being an outcome of its political development. The difference in the per capita income between a developing and a developed nation is colossal, but at the same time the political gap is not that much wide anymore. The essential reason for this entrancing political hole is the considerable stagnation which the political frameworks have observed in the developed nations’ during late decades. At the same time, some developing nations have been reliably getting nearer to the exceptionally imperfect level of political development of their propelled brethren. In other words, this political gap is getting narrower, not from the uprightness in the developing world, but rather from the advancement of worldwide political framework in a relatively wrong direction, which is more recognizable among the developed group of nations. This stagnation of the developed world has made it logically easier for developing nations to close that political hole.